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GAMMA ITEM

SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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Soviets Hint at Arms Aid for Pakistan

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June the Soviet military attache in Islamabad told Pakistan's Defense Secretary that should his government approach the USSR about obtaining military equipment, it might be "pleasantly surprised." Prime Minister Bhutto's foreign policy adviser Aziz Ahmed has also said he received similar hints from unspecified Soviets. This is the second time in recent months that the Pakistanis have alleged that Moscow has hinted at the possibility of renewed Soviet military assistance to Pakistan.

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The Soviets objected strongly to the US decision last February to resume arms shipments to the subcontinent and apparently instructed their new ambassador to Pakistan, who arrived in Islamabad shortly after the US decision was announced, to take a very tough line in his initial dealings with the Pakistanis. The ambassador's efforts failed to do anything but irritate the Pakistanis, and the Soviets may have subsequently concluded that the carrot would produce better results than the stick.

In all probability, renewed Soviet arms aid to Pakistan would not amount to much either quantitatively or qualitatively; it would be aimed mainly at preventing the US from fully capitalizing on its new arms supply policy in Pakistan and perhaps also at discouraging the Pakistanis from supporting the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean. No decision on renewed Soviet arms aid for Pakistan will be taken without due consideration of its likely impact on Soviet-Indian

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relations. Even a token Soviet agreement with Pakistan would bother the Indians. The Soviets may calculate, however, that given the size of the military aid agreement Moscow concluded with India last February—the largest ever between the two countries—and the state of India's relations with both China and the US, the USSR can live with a degree of Indian discomfiture. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)





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Soviet Sculptor May Try Again To Travel Abroad

Soviet sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, whose angry denunciation last week of the regime's refusal to let him travel abroad was widely publicized in the West, apparently will not let the matter rest for long. Western press reports indicate that he will at some point seek to have the decision reversed.

Last month, Neizvestny told the US embassy that his long-standing application for foreign travel had gone all the way to the Politburo (Staff Note, June 10). When the regime turned him down on July 7, he reacted by calling a press conference with Western newsmen in Moscow. His frustration, concern, and anger evidently overcame his earlier determination not to publicize the case lest he jeopardize his chances.

Neizvestny was particularly incensed at the spurious official claim that his foreign travel was disapproved because it would split a family. Neizvestny is separated but not divorced from his wife, who did not apply to leave the country. The press once again failed to make clear that Neizvestny does not wish to leave as an emigrant but to travel abroad on a Soviet passport.

Now a more recent press report quotes Neizvestny as saying that notwithstanding the official ban on any appeal of the turndown for a year, he will try to plead his case by "approaching senior officials." This suggests that he has not given up all hope; it is also an implict public reference to his earlier private claims of having a number of sympathizers among the middle and upper echelons of the Central Committee and elementer in Soviet officialdom. If Neizvestny's case is indeed considered by the Politburo, chances of early reconsideration are slim. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FORLIGN DISSEM)

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